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RECENT CASE NOTES
ALIMENTARY

DUTIES-MAINTENANCE

OF

CHILD

UPON

DivoRCF-The

plaintiff was granted a divorce from the defendant in 1923. In that decree
the plaintiff was given custody of the minor child and $5.00 a week for his
maintenance and support. The decree also made provision for the defendant's seeing the child at all reasonable times. This is an action for back
payments and punishment for contempt of court because of defendant's failure to obey the first decree. The defendant pleads as a defense the fact
that the child was removed from the state by the plaintiff and therefore
he was denied reasonable access and chance of visiting as provided by the
first decree. Held, that the removal of the child from the state does not
provide a good defense to this action. Zirkle v. Zirkle, 1930, 172 N. E. 192,
Sup. Ct. of Indiana.
In divorce proceedings, awarding the custody of minor children to one
or the other of the parents, we find two kinds of decrees. In one of these
the decree is silent as to maintenance but custody of the child is awarded
to the mother. In such a case there is a split of authority as to whether
or not the father is liable for the support of the children. Some cases hold
him not liable for two reasons (1) no allowance is awarded by the court
and (2) he is deprived of the child's services (Tribolt v. Tribolt, 158 Ind.
60, Ramsey v. Rawey, 121 Ind. 215).
A majority of cases, however, seem to hold that in such a case the
father is still liable for the support of his children. These cases so hold
on the ground that the father owes both the children and society a certain
fixed obligation and this obligation may be enforced against him, even
though he doesn't have the custody of the child. (McAllen v. McAllen, 97
Minn. 76, Buckwaster v. Buckmaster, 38 Vt. 248). Where the decree either
by statute, which is incorporated into the decree, or by express words in the
decree itself places the burden of support on the father, the cases are
unanimous in holding him liable for such specified support. (Welch's Appeal,
43 Conn. 342, Boudies v. Boudies, 39 Okla. 164).
The court in the principal case rightly holds that such a defense can't
be interposed. True a decree may well include a provision for the other
party having reasonable access to the child and such a provision may possibly be protected by making the child's custodian give bond to guard
against the taking of the child beyond the jurisdiction of the court for any
permanent period, but no case has allowed such a provision in a divorce
decree to be interposed as a defense for accrued allowances. (People V.
Paulding, 15 How. Pr. N. Y. 167; Deringer v. Deringer, 10 Phila. (Pa.)
190; Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 242 Ill. 552; Haley v. Haley, 44 Ark. 429;
Oliver v. Oliver, 151 Mass. 349.)
The court which renders the divorce decree and provides for allowance
and custody has continuing jurisdiction and at any subsequent time before
the child's attaining his majority may alter the decree both as to custody
and the amount of the allowance (Cox v. Cox, 25 Ind. 303; Hilliardv. An561
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derson, 197 Ill. 549; Perkins v. Perkins, 225 Mass. 392; Getting v. Getting,
197 Mich. 446).
The modification may be justified for various changed conditions such
as the father's financial condition, inadequacy of the provision in the original decree, etc.
But payments exacted by the original divorce decree become vested as
they accrue, and decrees which subsequently change the allowance cannot
have a retroactive effect. Such a decree relates only to the future. Kell
v. Kell, 179 Iowa 147; Evans v. Evans, 154 Cal. 644; Dilbridge v. Seares,
179 Iowa 526.
Thus it would seem that the court in the principal case has reached a
logical result and one that is in accord with established doctrines in this
field of the law.
B. E. M.
CONTRACTS-CONSIDERATION-PROMISSORY EsTOPPFr-Appellant owned
and operated a city water system. Appellee had been a customer of said
company for a long time prior to Feb. 11, 1929. On this date the appellee
requested appellant to shut off the flow of water by turning the shut-off valve
at the appellee's property line, as the house was to be vacated. Appellant
then and there agreed to do as requested. Appellee vacated the house, appellant attempted to turn off the water at the property line, but failed to do
so because of the frozen condition of the ground. Pipes in the house bursted,
and considerable damage resulted. Appellee's complaint was drawn upon
the theory that on Feb. 11, 1929, a binding contract was entered into, and
that appellant failed to perform its obligation to appellee's damage. Complainant received $275.00 judgment in the lower court. Held, judgment
reversed. Frankfort Waterworks Co. v. McBride, Appellate Court of Indiana, March 4, 1931, 175 N. E. 140.
The reversal was based solely upon the proposition that there was no
consideration for the appellant's promise, that no mutuality existed, and
that such promise was thus merely a gratuitous and unenforceable one.
Now it is quite evident that as a result of the reliance upon this promise,
the appellee suffered considerable damage. A moral duty on the promisor is
present, but of course a moral breach is often not a legal one. For more
than a century learned jurists interested in the problem of developing legal
duties to coordinate moral obligations, have puzzled themselves over the
desirability of giving a remedy to one who has incurred expense or disappointment through thinking that the other party was bound by his promise.
63 American Law Review, 33; Munroe Smith, A General View of European
Legal History, 195.
Those who have considered an extension in this direction have been confronted by the fact that the law of contracts is conceded to be a branch of
the law wherein a high degree of certainty is desirable. Any development
made should be one of fairly uniform and universal application. The doctrine offered as a solution to this present problem is that of "promissory
estoppel."
Williston discusses the subject under the heading of "Estoppel as a Substitute for Consideration," and cites several cases in which the principle
has been applied to the formation of contracts, where, relying on a gratuitous promise, the promisee has suffered detriment. Williston, Contracts,

